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Abstract—Bitcoin was the first successful decentralized cryp-
tocurrency and remains the most popular of its kind to this
day. Despite the benefits of its blockchain, Bitcoin still faces
serious scalability issues, most importantly its ever-increasing
blockchain size. While alternative designs introduced schemes to
periodically create snapshots and thereafter prune older blocks,
already-deployed systems such as Bitcoin are often considered
incapable of adopting corresponding approaches. In this work,
we revise this popular belief and present CoinPrune, a snapshot-
based pruning scheme that is fully compatible with Bitcoin.
CoinPrune can be deployed through an opt-in velvet fork, i.e.,
without impeding the established Bitcoin network. By requiring
miners to publicly announce and jointly reaffirm recent snapshots
on the blockchain, CoinPrune establishes trust into the snapshots’
correctness even in the presence of powerful adversaries. Our
evaluation shows that CoinPrune reduces the storage require-
ments of Bitcoin already by two orders of magnitude today,
with further relative savings as the blockchain grows. In our
experiments, nodes only have to fetch and process 5 GiB instead
of 230 GiB of data when joining the network, reducing the
synchronization time on powerful devices from currently 5 h to
46 min, with even more savings for less powerful devices.
Index Terms—blockchain; block pruning; synchronization;
bootstrapping; scalability; velvet fork; Bitcoin
I. INTRODUCTION
Bitcoin [1] and its (public) blockchain, an immutable
append-only ledger of financial transactions, constitute an on-
going success story. Via the blockchain, all nodes can indepen-
dently verify Bitcoin’s history and thus mutually distrusting
peers can establish consensus about the correctness of those
transactions, which now also fuels applications such as audit
systems [2]–[4], transparency overlays [5], [6], anonymity
bootstrapping services [7], and smart contracts [8].
However, Bitcoin also serves as a prime example of the scal-
ability challenges of widely used blockchain systems. Among
these challenges are, e.g., limited transaction throughput, high
payment verification delays [9], and, most importantly, ever-
growing blockchain sizes. For instance, Bitcoin’s blockchain
has a size of 253 GiB with a recent average growth rate of
139 MiB/d as of Apr 13, 2020 [10]. These high demands cause
individual nodes to prune historical blockchain data [11], i.e.,
older payment flows that have been superseded by newer ones.
While such decisions are rational from the user’s perspective,
they harm Bitcoin’s overall network health: To root trust into
Bitcoin’s current state, new nodes need to obtain and reverify
all blockchain data, including all historical data. Given the
decentralization of public blockchains, which are designed to
avoid trusted entities, new nodes require independent sources
to obtain all bootstrapping information.
While joining nodes would benefit most if every single
node held a full copy of the blockchain, already synchronized
nodes need to save disk space instead. To resolve this inherent
conflict of interests, alternative designs [12]–[15] proposed
snapshot-based synchronization, where new nodes do not
verify all historical data but rely on a recent snapshot of
the blockchain’s state. However, well-established blockchain
systems, such as Bitcoin, have especially high demands to
implement performance improvements but are hard to adapt at
the same time: Major changes have to be adopted by a majority
of nodes to prevent permanent network partitioning, which has
proven difficult in the past [16]. Based on these observations,
we identify and raise two main questions: (a) how to extend
existing blockchain systems with pruning capabilities and
(b) how to do so in a secure and trustworthy manner?
To answer both questions, we first survey approaches to
reducing blockchain sizes, arguing that they either are inef-
ficient, insecure, or not deployable to existing systems. We
thus propose CoinPrune1, a block-pruning scheme that is
fully compatible with Bitcoin and can be adopted immediately
by any subset of nodes. CoinPrune enables joining nodes to
synchronize via recent and trustworthy snapshots of Bitcoin’s
state. By establishing additional trust into these snapshots
in a distributed manner, CoinPrune drastically unburdens all
Bitcoin nodes: First, new nodes only need to obtain a small
fraction of the blockchain. Further, CoinPrune enables all
nodes to prune obsolete information without affecting the
overall network health. CoinPrune establishes trust by pe-
riodically having miners cryptographically tie snapshots to
the blockchain while other miners independently reaffirm the
snapshots’ correctness. Thus, assuming an appropriate partial
adoption of our scheme, joining nodes may rely on the hon-
est network majority to verify snapshots. Reaffirmations are
ignored by legacy nodes and do not affect block acceptance.
Hence, CoinPrune can be deployed mid-operation via a velvet
fork [17], [18]. Consequently, new nodes only require a recent
reaffirmed snapshot and subsequent full blocks to synchronize.
Our evaluation shows that full nodes and miners supporting
CoinPrune can reduce disk space utilization by 86 %. Still,
they are able to help joining nodes synchronize. In fact,
CoinPrune drastically improves synchronization performance:
While network traffic generated by joining nodes is reduced
by 93 %, synchronization time drops from 5 h to 46 min on
powerful devices and even more for less powerful devices.
1Research prototype available at https://github.com/COMSYS/coinprune
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II. BITCOIN OVERVIEW
We start off with a primer on Bitcoin before describing its
transaction management, blockchain layout with implications
on consensus updates, and its bootstrapping process.
Bitcoin Primer. Bitcoin’s [1] main contribution was its
blockchain, a public and immutable append-only ledger of
financial transactions to prevent the double-spending of coins
within an untrusted peer-to-peer (P2P) network. Bitcoin estab-
lishes this ledger by bundling pending transactions in crypto-
graphically interlinked, hard-to-create blocks. The blockchain
is jointly maintained by a P2P network of full nodes that
locally verify pending transactions and blocks, discarding
any incorrect information. Special nodes, the miners, invest
their computational power to create new blocks by solving a
proof-of-work (PoW) puzzle in exchange for freshly minted
bitcoins as a reward. Modifying blocks at a later point becomes
increasingly hard as it requires recomputing all subsequent
blocks to keep their chaining intact.
Transaction Management. Each transaction transfers pre-
viously received or minted bitcoins to one or more re-
ceivers via individual transaction outputs. To prevent double-
spending, full nodes have to verify claimed coin ownership
for all pending transactions. For efficiency reasons, all nodes
keep track of the current set of unspent transaction outputs
(UTXO set). Thereby, nodes can discard pending transactions
that attempt to spend non-existing or already spent bitcoins.
Notably, by default, full nodes prune all spent transactions
from their transaction index, i.e., if they do not contribute to
the UTXO set anymore. Nevertheless, these nodes retain a full
copy of historical blocks to help bootstrap new nodes.
Blockchain Layout and Consensus Updates. Each Bitcoin
block consists of a header and a set of transactions attached
to the block via a Merkle tree. The 80 B-long header consists
of a version field, the hash value of the block’s predecessor
for chaining the blocks, the Merkle tree root to cryptographi-
cally tie the transactions to the block header, an approximate
timestamp, as well as the miner’s PoW. Given the distributed
nature of Bitcoin, blockchain forks, i.e., situations in which the
blockchain diverges into more than one potential path forward,
can occur either accidentally or with intent. Accidental forks
occur when multiple miners find valid blocks concurrently.
These forks are resolved naturally since one branch is highly
likely to grow faster (i.e., accumulate more PoW), causing
all nodes to abandon other branches in favor of the fastest-
growing branch. Intentional forks are used to update existing
consensus rules and are traditionally categorized as either hard
forks or soft forks [18]. While hard forks introduce protocol-
breaking changes to the consensus rules, e.g., altered block
structures, soft forks aim to remain backward-compatible with
clients following older consensus rules [18]. Both paradigms
can incur permanent blockchain forks depending on whether
the majority of nodes accepts or rejects the proposed changes.
Contrarily, multiple works [17], [18] recently investigated
velvet forks, which aim to allow for the gradual introduction
of new features without creating permanent forks. This type of
fork augments upgraded blocks in a way that is still valid to
legacy nodes, while updated nodes process them in accordance
with the changed protocol.
Initial Synchronization. When a node first joins the Bitcoin
network, it needs to obtain its individual view on Bitcoin’s
current state of consensus, i.e., the UTXO set resulting from
the blockchain path containing most PoW. To keep this pro-
cess fully decentralized and independent from trusted nodes,
each node initially establishes eight outgoing connections to
random established nodes, called neighbors, and downloads
the complete blockchain from them. Due to the separation of
headers and transactions, nodes first fetch the headerchain, i.e.,
chain of block headers, and simultaneously request full blocks,
i.e., the corresponding transactions. While receiving the data,
the joining node verifies its correctness by (a) verifying
the blockchain’s cryptographic links back to the hard-coded
genesis block, (b) keeping track of the amount of performed
PoW to remain on the currently valid blockchain, (c) validating
transaction sets tied to each block, and (d) by checking
the correctness of transactions and replaying them to obtain
an up-to-date UTXO set. Even though this information is
sufficient to process newly mined blocks, nodes keep a full
copy of the blockchain by default.
III. IMPACT OF GROWING BLOCKCHAIN SIZES
By design, blockchains continuously grow in size and thus
eventually reach prohibitive sizes. For instance, the most popu-
lar system, Bitcoin, suffers from a blockchain size of currently
253 GiB with a recent average growth rate of 139 MiB/d as of
Apr 13, 2020 [10]. This worrying trend severely impacts the
scalability of the overall network. In addition to increasing disk
space requirements, which already today exclude devices such
as smartphones from running a full Bitcoin node, we observe
negative influences of bandwidth requirements, processing
costs, and synchronization times of newly joining nodes.
Storage Requirements. To retain a decentralized consen-
sus network, Bitcoin requires that enough independent nodes
persistently maintain a full blockchain copy to help bootstrap
joining nodes (cf. Section II). However, storing hundreds of
Gigabytes of historical blockchain data is both irrational for in-
dividual node operators and prohibitive on storage-constrained
devices. In consequence, such devices cannot act as full nodes,
and users have to accept weakened security guarantees.
Bandwidth Requirements. During initial synchronization,
each joining node must obtain a full blockchain copy. Current
blockchain sizes already require good Internet connectivity
for both the joining node and its serving nodes, potentially
causing increased initial synchronization times for joining
nodes. Furthermore, such requirements also put an additional
burden onto existing nodes as serving new nodes consumes
resources that could otherwise be used for other tasks, e.g.,
gossiping pending transactions or newly mined blocks.
Processing Costs. In addition to downloading the
blockchain, joining nodes also need to verify the blockchain’s
integrity and locally replay every single transaction to build
the UTXO set. This process consumes excessive amounts of
computation power for joining nodes. Especially, the presence
of large numbers of obsolete transactions that do not contribute
to the UTXO set wastes valuable resources anymore.
Synchronization Time. The combination of high band-
width requirements and high processing costs cause pro-
longed synchronization times. While benchmarks using pow-
erful clients report about 5 h in 2018 [19], literature already
highlighted this issue in 2016 when four days were required to
synchronize Amazon EC2 nodes [9]. Naturally, this problem
aggravates over time as new blocks are added continuously.
In summary, the ever-growing blockchain heavily impedes
the scalability of the overall system for both joining and
existing nodes. Existing nodes are even punished for acting
altruistically in the network by helping joining nodes synchro-
nize. These problems are especially severe for popular systems
such as Bitcoin. In the following, we survey to which extent
(newly proposed) schemes attempt to tackle these issues.
IV. THE CURRENT STATE OF BLOCKCHAIN PRUNING
Blockchains, especially public ones, have long suffered
from their limited scalability. Consequentially, developers have
tackled these scalability challenges from different perspectives.
In this section, we survey current state-of-the-art measures de-
ployed to existing systems as well as alternative blockchain de-
signs that focus on reducing storage requirements and improv-
ing the bootstrapping. Other works that consider blockchain
data management, but are not covered here explicitly, include
analyses of blockchain data [32]–[36] and the UTXO set [37],
approaches to prevent illicit content from being engraved into
the blockchain [38]–[43], sharding approaches [44]–[46], and
lightweight payment schemes [47], [48].
A. Survey Criteria and Methodology
We qualitatively assess the applicability and effectiveness
of related approaches based on their (a) scalability improve-
ments, (b) whether they maintain sufficient levels of security,
(c) their impact on the overall network, (d) potential impact
on blockchain queryability, (e) and their compatibility with
already established public blockchain systems such as Bitcoin.
Regarding scalability improvements, we separately consider
processing, traffic, and storage. Based on these improvements,
we discuss the overall impact on synchronization times for
joining nodes. We resort to a qualitative assessment of the pre-
sented approaches, as most works do not present performance
benchmarks. We comment on the approaches’ security by
discussing whether or not these proposals actively weaken se-
curity guarantees of the base system. Furthermore, we discuss
the impact on the overall network by considering the network
health, i.e., the dependency on especially altruistic nodes,
and the potential overhead the approaches may introduce for
already synchronized nodes. Then, we assess how the proposed
schemes may impact the blockchain queryability, e.g., the
capability of querying historical transactions or augmented
transactions such as Bitcoin’s OP_RETURN transactions. Fi-
nally, we survey their compatibility with already deployed
blockchain systems. We summarize our results in Table I.
B. Measures Deployed in Existing Blockchain Systems
The increased popularity of cryptocurrencies forced their
developers to tackle rising scalability issues. In this sec-
tion, we present measures taken either by users locally or
by blockchain developers network-wide. Our discussion is
based on the reference implementations (Bitcoin Core and
Ethereum’s geth, respectively) where appropriate. Overall,
we identify approaches based on trust delegation, skipping
verification steps, improving data management with the special
case of block pruning, and state-based synchronization.
Trust Delegation. Users can delegate their trust into the
blockchain’s correctness to third parties if they cannot operate
a full node, e.g., when using a constrained device for issuing
transactions. Using hot wallets [20], users essentially out-
source all fund management to a trusted third party, enabling
the service provider to issue transactions on their behalf.
Similarly, light nodes [21] outsource blockchain verification
to other full nodes, but they manage their wallet locally using
simplified payment verification (SPV) [1]. These approaches
vastly improve the performance of clients, only put a negligible
burden on the full nodes, and they are actively used. However,
they only seize the resources of other nodes and do not
contribute positively to the overall network. Contrarily, trust-
delegating nodes heavily rely on a backbone network of full
nodes for both trust and relevant information and prohibit
local verifiability. The never deployed Ultimate Compression
scheme [22] aimed at bootstrapping light nodes with the
current UTXO set but requires full nodes to store and transmit
a searchable representation of the UTXO set in addition to its
full blockchain copy, putting extra burden on the full nodes.
Furthermore, this scheme requires an additional blockchain to
establish trust in the transmitted UTXO set.
Improving Data Management. Increasing blockchain sizes
necessitate optimized data management, either for looking
up relevant information or for efficiently bootstrapping new
nodes. To this end, Bitcoin Core has historically changed its
underlying database system [23] and the internal layout of
its UTXO set [24]. Furthermore, full nodes locally prune
irrelevant entries from their transaction index [23]. While
the raw blockchain data is still persisted, historical infor-
mation is not queryable anymore. Network-related optimiza-
tions mainly engulf a revised header-first download of the
blockchain [25]. Verifying the headerchain is sufficient to
ensure the blockchain’s integrity. Since transactions can be
decoupled from their block’s headers (cf. Section II), nodes
can now download and verify full blocks in parallel with
only minor and local upgrading incompatibilities [25]. Nodes
can further limit their block-serving bandwidth [49], and they
can relay compact representations of newly mined blocks,
thereby avoiding transmitting known-but-pending transactions
redundantly [50]. However, header-first download still requires
to transfer and process all blockchain data during initial
synchronization, only its distribution is more efficient.
Skipping Verification. Bitcoin’s reference implementation
started early on to avoid reverifying transactions from very
TABLE I
QUALITATIVE COMPARISON OF APPROACHES IMPROVING STORAGE REQUIREMENTS AND INITIAL SYNCHRONIZATION
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Hot Wallets [20] Trust Delegation # /  # /  # /  # /  # #  #  
Light Nodes [21] Trust Delegation # /  # /  # /  # /  G# #  #  
“Ultimate Compression” [22] Trust Delegation # /  # /  # /  # /  #  #   
DB Improvements [23], [24] Data Management G# # # G#      
Index Pruning [23] Data Management G# # G# G#    G#  
Headers-first Download [25] Data Management # # # G#     G#
Assume-valid Blocks [26], [27] Skip Verification  # # G#      
Block Pruning [11] Simple Block Pruning # #  #  #  G#  
Ethereum Fast Sync [28] State-based Sync.  # #      #
R
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Selective Pruning [29] Simple Block pruning G# G#  G# #  #  #
Rollerchain [14] State-based Sync.       G# G# #
Marsalek et al. [30] State-based Sync. # /  # /  # /    G# G# G# #
Mini Blockchain Scheme [12] Balance-based Sync.      G# G# # #
Mimblewimble [13] Balance-based Sync. # G# G# #    # #
Pascal [15] Balance-based Sync.     G# #  G# #
Vault [31] Balance-based Sync.        G# #
CoinPrune (our approach) State-based Sync.      *  * G# G#  
2 /2: Distinction Full Nodes / Light Nodes ∗: Dependent on honest majority among adopters (cf. Section VIII)
old blocks. Using hard-coded checkpoint blocks at first [26],
Bitcoin has recently shifted to use configurable assumed-valid
blocks [27]. The reasoning here is that invalid transactions
would have been rejected by the network earlier, and thus
older transactions with many confirmations are believed to be
correct. By skipping assumed-valid blocks, joining nodes can
avoid the costly signature verification of large portions of the
blockchain at negligible security risks. However, joining nodes
still download the complete blockchain to replay all historical
transactions to create an up-to-date UTXO set.
Simple Block Pruning. To counter increasing storage re-
quirements, Bitcoin users have the option to completely prune
raw blockchain data [11] after a full initial synchronization.
This step allows nodes to forget all historical blockchain data
at the cost of its queryability. In contrast to local index pruning,
block pruning is detrimental to the network health as block-
pruning nodes are incapable of bootstrapping new nodes.
State-based Synchronization. While Bitcoin focuses
on financial transactions, other cryptocurrencies, such as
Ethereum [8], are also capable of executing smart contracts.
Naturally, those cryptocurrencies have more complex state
layouts as the full nodes need to keep track of every smart con-
tract’s state. Consequentially, Ethereum uses Fast Sync [28],
which enables joining nodes to download a recent state and
thereby avoids replaying all historical information. However,
Ethereum still values the queryability of historical data, and
thus joining nodes also download and persist all blocks, but
do not have to process them during initial synchronization.
In contrast to Bitcoin’s proposal for Ultimate Compression,
Fast Sync remains secure since Ethereum, by default, cryp-
tographically ties its current state to each block [8]. Thus,
nodes can verify the correctness of their obtained state directly
via Ethereum’s blockchain. Since other cryptocurrencies lack
these header fields, Fast Sync is not immediately portable.
Takeaway. Developers have tackled the scalability issues
of blockchain systems from different perspectives. However,
all approaches have either limited efficiency, questionable
security properties, are detrimental to network health, or are
not portable to a variety of already deployed systems.
C. Proposed Block-Pruning Schemes
The insufficiency of post-deployment pruning schemes in-
spired various alternative blockchain designs, promising better
scalability than established systems. We identify alternative
designs that refine mere block-pruning schemes as well as de-
signs proposing state-based or balance-based synchronization.
Simple Block Pruning. Palm et al. [29] present a distributed
block-pruning scheme for established nodes in permissioned
blockchains, i.e., blockchains jointly maintained by a fixed
set of mutually known parties. A dedicated initiator defines
a pruning algorithm that must be executed by all nodes to
identify and prune now-irrelevant transactions in a way that all
relevant data is still retrievable from other nodes. However, this
approach focuses on permissioned blockchains and requires
a dedicated initiator. Hence, the approach is inapplicable to
public settings, which are open to unknown or unauthenticated
parties, both for security and compatibility reasons.
State-based Synchronization. Similarly to Ethereum Fast
Sync and inheriting its advantages and disadvantages, Roller-
chain [14] proposes state-based initial synchronization. How-
ever, Rollerchain values performance over complete querya-
bility, thereby significantly decreasing bootstrapping overhead
as old information does not need to be transmitted and
stored. Similarly, Marsalek et al. [30] propose a state-based
synchronization based on Bitcoin but abandon compatibility
by rejecting blocks that have invalid states attached.
Balance-based Synchronization. A special class of state-
based block-pruning schemes simplifies the structure of what
constitutes a state to allow for more efficient representations
and updates [12], [13], [15], [31]. Typically, these schemes
only keep track of existing accounts and their balances. The
Mini-Blockchain scheme [12] replaces Bitcoin’s UTXO set
with an account tree that is cryptographically tied to each
mined block. Joining nodes obtain the headerchain and a
recent account tree to synchronize, before fully processing a
tail of full blocks to preserve PoW-based security. However,
such a scheme expects established nodes to compute slices of
the recent account tree on demand, without commenting on
the availability of all required data to rewind the account tree
accordingly within the network. Mimblewimble [13] follows
a similar approach, but emphasizes confidential transactions
at the cost of synchronization performance as joining nodes
have to obtain and verify rangeproofs for unspent funds [13].
Through their balance-based approach, both schemes limit the
expressiveness of transactions. To overcome this limitation,
Pascal [15] defines SafeBoxes as a replacement for mere
account trees. SafeBoxes permit the generation of a limited
number of accounts per block and are designed to enable
upper-layer applications, but the limited availability of account
spots is conceptually detrimental to network health. Finally,
Vault [31] builds on Algorand [51] to enable the distribution
of fragments of recent states across the network to reduce the
per-node storage requirements. Therefore, Vault is inapplicable
as an aid for existing, simpler cryptocurrencies.
Takeaway. Alternative blockchain designs have shown that
incorporating cryptographic ties to recent state objects are a
promising means to establish trust in state-based blockchain
synchronization processes. However, extending existing sys-
tems with such capabilities immediately results in hard forks,
which are difficult to deploy and thus highly debated [16].
V. REQUIREMENTS FOR SECURE BLOCK PRUNING
Blockchain systems require that sufficiently many nodes
maintain a full local copy of the blockchain (cf. Section II).
While this initial design becomes massively burdening for
these nodes as well as joining nodes, multiple approaches
to fully pruning historical data have been proposed (cf. Sec-
tion IV-C). However, none of these approaches can be adapted
to directly provide similar optimizations for established sys-
tems (e.g., Bitcoin) without provoking major incompatibilities.
To realize fully compatible extensions for the network-wide
pruning of obsolete information in existing cryptocurrencies,
while maintaining already established security levels, we
identify the following requirements and design goals:
(G1) Scalability. To be effective, pruning schemes must
provide improvements for all metrics discussed in Section III,
i.e., storage and bandwidth demands for joining and block-
serving nodes, processing costs, and synchronization time.
(G2) Correctness. Starting from the initial genesis block,
each joining node must obtain the same internal state, with
or without the block-pruning scheme enabled, to ensure that
the network’s consensus about accepted transactions is kept
intact. In particular, the node must learn about all accepted,
non-obsolete events, and it must not accept any false events.
(G3) Verifiability. As security is a top priority, our pruning
scheme must keep joining nodes able to verify the correctness
of the synchronization process even in the presence of adver-
saries. Here, we require that the block-pruning scheme does
not reduce the security of the overall blockchain system.
(G4) Compatibility. Popular and long-living blockchain
systems are especially affected by scalability limitations. In-
stead of proposing new systems (cf. Section IV-C), all changes
should be applicable to existing blockchains, especially Bit-
coin, even during operation. Preferably, the scheme is opt-in,
e.g., as achieved via velvet forks (cf. Section II).
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Fig. 1. High-level design overview of CoinPrune. Instead of downloading
and verifying all blockchain data, joining nodes obtain a recent snapshot in a
trustworthy manner due to its on-chain reaffirmations by multiple miners.
VI. COINPRUNE DESIGN
To address the challenges resulting from the ever-increasing
size of existing blockchains, we present CoinPrune, our
secure, state-based block-pruning scheme that is gradually
deployable without protocol-breaking changes, e.g., to Bitcoin.
After giving an overview of CoinPrune, we first present how
nodes using our scheme coordinate via Bitcoin’s blockchain
and then present how joining nodes can bootstrap.
A. CoinPrune Overview
CoinPrune is designed to transfer scalability improvements
of novel blockchain designs (cf. Section IV-C) to Bitcoin while
keeping compatibility a priority. We now describe how Coin-
Prune nodes, i.e., Bitcoin nodes additionally supporting Coin-
Prune, jointly maintain recent snapshots on the blockchain,
explain how new nodes can bootstrap securely using those
snapshots, and outline benefits for the whole network.
Snapshot Maintenance. CoinPrune nodes periodically cre-
ate snapshots of their current UTXO set. These snapshots
are served to joining nodes instead of the entirety of his-
torical blockchain data for reduced storage, bandwidth, and
processing requirements (G1). They are tied to the current
block height, i.e., the position of the most recent block in
the blockchain, and contain a well-ordered UTXO set for
synchronization (G2) and verification (G3) purposes, respec-
tively. To prevent malicious nodes from distributing incorrect
snapshots, e.g., in an attempt to multiply their unspent funds,
CoinPrune requires snapshots to be publicly announced to
the blockchain by referencing a cryptographic identifier of
each snapshot on-chain. CoinPrune-supporting miners place
these announcements in their blocks’ coinbase transactions,
which miners issue to mint new coins. By utilizing an existing
field in coinbase transactions, which may contain 100 B of
arbitrary data, we keep CoinPrune Bitcoin-compatible (G4).
Other CoinPrune miners independently do the same, which
causes nodes deriving snapshots from the same UTXO set
to mutually reaffirm that snapshot’s validity. This approach
creates positive-only feedback, i.e., wrong snapshots are not
rejected but tolerated and outpaced by valid reaffirmations
given an honest majority of CoinPrune miners.
Bootstrapping Nodes. Instead of downloading all historical
blockchain data, a joining node can securely bootstrap in
three steps, as shown in Figure 1: First, the node obtains
a recent snapshot either from its neighbors or through a
snapshot-offering third party. If opting for P2P-based snapshot
acquisition, the node downloads the snapshot that advocated
by most neighbors, given an absolute majority for one snap-
shot. Second, the node downloads the headerchain, i.e., the
interconnected and lightweight block headers, to learn about
the blockchain branch with the most PoW in it. Third, the node
downloads the chaintail, i.e., the full blocks starting from the
snapshot’s block height. Via the chaintail, the joining node can
(a) catch up with recent transactions, and (b) inspect the full
blocks for snapshot reaffirmations. If the joining node observes
sufficiently many reaffirmations of the snapshot, it accepts
the snapshot and concludes initial synchronization. Otherwise,
the node starts over by discarding the insecure snapshot and
reconnecting to a new set of neighbors.
Global Block Pruning. Since joining nodes can securely
bootstrap from the headerchain, the snapshot, and the chain-
tail, all CoinPrune nodes may now safely prune historical
blocks prior to the snapshot. As new snapshots are reaffirmed
periodically, nodes may also prune aging snapshots as well
without hurting the network health. Single archival nodes may
still keep a full blockchain copy to retain full and reliable
queryability of historical data.
B. Adapted Data Management
To understand CoinPrune in detail, we discuss the layout
of its snapshots and the required changes to nodes’ local data
management stemming from the pruning of historical blocks.
Snapshot Creation. Each snapshot corresponds to a specific
block height, meaning that it represents a serialization of the
UTXO set obtained from processing all blocks up to and in-
cluding that height. A CoinPrune snapshot consists of a simple
header and multiple chunks of serialized UTXOs, and it is
referenced on-chain by a cryptographic identifier. The header
holds the snapshot’s corresponding block height, that block’s
identifier, and the number of chunks in the snapshot. The
identifier is a special hash value created over the snapshot’s
header and chunks to uniquely represent the snapshot in a
succinct manner. First, the header and each chunk are hashed
individually using Bitcoin’s HASH256 function (SHA256 ap-
plied twice). Then, the snapshot identifier is the hash value
of the concatenation of these hash values. Using this simple
snapshot serialization, joining nodes are immediately aware of
all available chunks and can independently request individual
chunks from different neighbors in parallel. Further, we limit
chunk sizes to 1 MB akin to Bitcoin’s maximum block size.
Persisted Information. By shifting to snapshot-based syn-
chronization, nodes may now prune historical full blocks.
However, the nodes must remain capable of serving the full
headerchain to joining nodes. Before pruning blocks, these
nodes thus need to persist some information currently held
by Bitcoin’s block index. These are block identifiers, headers,
block heights, the amount of PoW, the number of transactions,
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Fig. 2. Our pulse-based coordination triggers the creation of new snapshots.
Any invalid or delayed reaffirmations are ignored.
and the block’s timestamp. Persisting this data, a recent
snapshot, and the chaintail of not-yet-prunable full blocks is
now sufficient to securely bootstrap joining nodes.
C. Coordination of CoinPrune Nodes
CoinPrune relies on an honest majority of snapshot-serving
nodes to mutually reaffirm recent snapshots’ correctness to
provide a trust anchor for joining nodes. To this end, these
established nodes must agree on when to create snapshots
and how to publish reaffirmations. As shown in Figure 2,
CoinPrune uses pulse blocks pi issued in constant intervals
∆P , e.g., every 10 000 blocks, and synchronize the snapshot
creation and reaffirmation activities among CoinPrune nodes.
Through ∆P , CoinPrune can tune the frequency of snapshot
creation and thereby adjust processing and storage overheads
for CoinPrune nodes. Nodes create a new snapshot whenever
a pulse block has been mined. They base the snapshot on
the pulse block’s corresponding UTXO set. Subsequently, all
CoinPrune miners reaffirm the new snapshot in blocks they
mine until the shorter reaffirmation window ∆R expires. To
reaffirm a snapshot, the miners add the snapshot’s identifier
to their blocks’ coinbase fields. While not all Bitcoin blocks
mined during ∆R must contain a reaffirmation and individual
blocks may reaffirm invalid snapshots, an honest majority
among CoinPrune miners ensures that the valid, new snap-
shot will accumulate reaffirmations the fastest. Nodes accept
the snapshot with the most reaffirmations if that snapshot
was reaffirmed at least k times during ∆R. This acceptance
threshold k protects nodes from accepting snapshots reaffirmed
by individual adversaries with low mining power in times of
low overall CoinPrune participation. Consequently, all nodes
can safely ignore any reaffirmations that are outpaced by
reaffirmations of another snapshot or that lie outside of ∆R.
If no snapshot reaches k reaffirmations during ∆R, this pulse
is invalid, and pruning is delayed until the next pulse starts.
D. Bootstrapping New Nodes
The reaffirmations periodically published on Bitcoin’s
blockchain allow joining nodes to bootstrap as follows. First,
the node obtains a recent snapshot. The node can either
acquire a recent snapshot through external means, e.g., mirror
servers, or ask its neighbors for the most recent snapshots
they are aware of using off-chain P2P requests. Second, the
joining node downloads and verifies the headerchain from
its neighbors to learn about the blockchain branch with the
most PoW in it, as is already done by Bitcoin [25]. Third,
instead of downloading and processing all historical data,
the joining node applies the previously obtained snapshot in
good faith to initially fill its UTXO set. Finally, the joining
node fetches and processes the chaintail, i.e., the remaining
full blocks succeeding the snapshot’s block height, to finalize
synchronizing its UTXO set. During this full synchronization
phase, the joining node additionally inspects the chaintail’s
coinbase transactions for reaffirmations of its applied snapshot.
If the node learns that its snapshot was the most-reaffirmed one
during ∆R and was reaffirmed at least k times, it accepts the
snapshot, which concludes the bootstrapping step. Otherwise,
the joining node aborts and obtains a different snapshot from
another source, e.g., by connecting to a new set of neighbors.
VII. SEAMLESS INTEGRATION INTO BITCOIN
CoinPrune’s main feature is its immediate applicability to
Bitcoin (G4). In this section, we present our means to achieve
gradual opt-in deployability to Bitcoin via a velvet fork,
assuming that a sufficient share of honest miners makes a
rational choice to support CoinPrune, e.g., to preserve storage.
On-Chain Data. Although snapshot reaffirmations must be
publicly announced on Bitcoin’s blockchain, CoinPrune’s uti-
lization of only a block’s coinbase field prevents any protocol-
breaking changes. Full nodes that are unaware of CoinPrune
will ignore any snapshot reaffirmation, and CoinPrune nodes
will never reject blocks containing incorrect reaffirmations.
Instead, they will try to outpace incorrect reaffirmations with
legitimate ones. Hence, our scheme fulfills the requirements
for a gradually deployable velvet fork [17], [18]. To prevent
CoinPrune nodes from confusing snapshot reaffirmations with
other coinbase data, we propose to encapsulate the reaffirma-
tion accordingly, e.g., using a unique prefix and separators
such as CoinPrune/[snapshot_id]/.
Peer-to-Peer Protocol. Even though CoinPrune allows for
external snapshot sources, most joining nodes will likely rely
on Bitcoin’s network to obtain their initial snapshot. To enable
this Bitcoin-intrinsic snapshot acquisition, we extend Bitcoin’s
P2P protocol [52] with an additional GETSTATE message type
sent by CoinPrune nodes. Joining nodes send a GETSTATE
message to each neighbor to learn about available recent
snapshots. Each neighbor responds with an inventory (INV
message) that contains the hash values of the snapshot header
and the chunks of their most recent available and successfully
reaffirmed snapshot as STATE objects. The joining node uses
these INV messages to determine which snapshot to obtain and
to derive that snapshot’s identifier. Then, the node continues
to request individual chunks of the most-advertised snapshot
from its neighbors using sequences of GETDATA messages.
Finally, the node applies the state once all chunks are available.
For increased compatibility, we restrict chunk sizes to 1 MB,
i.e., Bitcoin’s maximum block size, and we introduce a new
service flag for Bitcoin’s VERSION handshake to avoid sending
unknown messages to CoinPrune-unaware nodes.
Takeaway. Bitcoin nodes can adopt CoinPrune immediately
without creating forks or causing issues on the P2P layer.
VIII. SECURITY DISCUSSION
We argue that CoinPrune bootstraps nodes correctly (G2)
based on verifiable snapshots (G3) as (a) our on-chain reaf-
firmations reliably reference snapshots from arbitrary sources,
that (b) positive-only feedback from an honest majority of
CoinPrune miners establishes trust in snapshots, and that
(c) CoinPrune is not prone to additional P2P-layer attacks.
Verifying Snapshot Validity. Joining nodes must be able
to verify the benignity of a snapshot reliably based on our
on-chain reaffirmations. To achieve this, CoinPrune derives
snapshot identifiers from a cryptographic hash function in a
layered manner. Each snapshot chunk is hashed individually.
Hence, full nodes cannot alter individual chunks during initial
synchronization without having the joining node notice the
manipulation. Furthermore, the snapshot identifier covers the
snapshot’s meta information as well as all chunks’ hash values.
Hence, joining nodes can verify that they obtain exactly
the required snapshot chunks, and they know precisely to
which block height the snapshot corresponds. Consequently,
no adversary can trick a joining node into accepting an altered
snapshot, nor can they create inconsistencies as to how to
apply the snapshot (e.g., to reintroduce obsolete UTXOs).
Reliability of Reaffirmations. Even though joining nodes
can reliably associate their obtained snapshots with on-chain
reaffirmations, our scheme deliberately tolerates the presence
of reaffirmations to invalid snapshots to maximize CoinPrune’s
compatibility with Bitcoin. Consequentially, we need to pre-
vent joining nodes from accepting invalid snapshots as suffi-
ciently reaffirmed. CoinPrune achieves this in a similar manner
as Bitcoin keeps its blockchain secure. Assuming an honest
majority among CoinPrune-supporting miners, snapshots that
are derived correctly from pulse blocks will eventually ac-
cumulate reaffirmations faster than other snapshots. Hence,
joining nodes should not rely on snapshots with only fewer
than k on-chain reaffirmations. We note that low adoption
of CoinPrune could give slow-but-steady malicious miners a
relative advantage. However, by introducing the reaffirmation
window ∆R, adversaries with low relative mining power
within the Bitcoin network are highly unlikely to successfully
reaffirm an invalid snapshot in time even if they temporarily
constitute a dishonest majority among CoinPrune nodes. Fi-
nally, a trusted third party can temporarily aid this transition
phase by releasing signed snapshot identifiers redundantly to
on-chain reaffirmations.
P2P Attacks. CoinPrune integrates well with Bitcoin’s P2P
protocol and only adds GETSTATE messages and STATE in-
ventories. Hence, considerations regarding Bitcoin’s resilience
against DoS attacks or Eclipse attacks [53] directly transfer
to CoinPrune. Furthermore, adversaries cannot partially ma-
nipulate or completely replace valid snapshots, as discussed
above. If joining nodes thus observe an attempted attack, they
can abort bootstrapping and connect to a new set of neighbors.
Takeaway. CoinPrune enables joining nodes to obtain snap-
shots from any source and to still rely on its on-chain reaffir-
mations to synchronize correctly with the Bitcoin network.
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Fig. 3. Currently, our scheme already reduces
storage requirements by two orders of magnitude.
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20
09
20
10
20
11
20
12
20
13
20
14
20
15
20
16
20
17
20
18
20
19
0 100k 200k 300k 400k 500k 600k
Block Height
0
1
2
3
4
5
Sy
nc
. T
im
e 
[h
]
Bitcoin Core
CoinPrune
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times, yet the snapshot size impacts performance.
IX. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
We now demonstrate that CoinPrune enables massive per-
formance savings for Bitcoin nodes (G1). After describing our
testbed setup, we present the storage savings achieved for all
nodes. Further, we show that traffic and synchronization time
for joining nodes are massively reduced as well.
A. Testbed Setup for Synchronization Measurements
We created a proof-of-concept implementation of CoinPrune
based on Bitcoin Core v0.17.1. Our measurements run on a
server (2× Intel Xeon E5-2630 v4, 32 GB RAM, 8 TB Seagate
IronWolf ST8000VN0022-2EL112), which synchronizes from
eight identical commodity PCs (Intel Core2 Quad Q9400,
8 GB RAM, 500 GB Hitachi Deskstar 7K500) via a Linksys
SLM2024 Gigabit switch. We measure synchronizing with
Bitcoin’s blockchain in increments of 10 000 blocks up until
a block height of 600 000 (Oct 19, 2019) and additional 1000
blocks (∼1 week of blocks) as our chaintail. We perform
synchronization via vanilla Bitcoin Core in one go and start
synchronization via CoinPrune from the snapshots’ respective
block heights. While storage requirements are fully determined
by the blockchain data, synchronization times and traffic may
vary. Hence, they were averaged over ten independent runs,
and we show the 99 % confidence intervals. We omitted to
check the coinbase field for the snapshot identifier to be able
to use Bitcoin’s real blockchain for our measurements.
B. Storage Savings
CoinPrune allows all Bitcoin nodes to prune historical
blocks in exchange for maintaining a recent snapshot and the
headerchain to serve joining nodes. In Figure 3, we depict how
the main contributors to Bitcoin’s storage demand changed
over time in comparison to the serialized snapshot and header-
chain required to operate CoinPrune. From this, we derive the
overall storage requirements for Bitcoin Core and CoinPrune,
respectively. For Bitcoin’s storage requirements, we consider
the heavily dominating blocks folder containing raw block
data, information required to rewind blocks efficiently, and
the block index, as well as the chainstate folder holding
the UTXO set. In contrast to this, CoinPrune needs to store
one serialized snapshot and the serialized headerchain, as
well as the UTXO set and chaintail for live operation. Our
measurements show that the sizes of serialized snapshots
align well with those of Bitcoin’s UTXO set. Minor variances
stem from different encodings of both data structures. Further,
persisting the headerchain to reconstruct Bitcoin’s block index
comes at only negligible costs of 125.00 B per block, resulting
in a headerchain size of 71.53 MiB for our latest measurement.
Finally, considering block heights starting from 300 000, the
chaintail has an average size of 0.99 GiB. Overall, CoinPrune
nodes could thus historically reduce their storage requirements
by 85.60 %, with the largest absolute and relative savings,
currently 255.42 GiB, at higher block heights. These savings
account for a decrease of two orders of magnitude, with the
potential for becoming even larger as the blockchain grows.
C. Evaluation of Synchronization Performance
Pruning obsolete data not only relieves Bitcoin nodes
from storage depletion but also joining nodes benefit from
widespread adoption of CoinPrune. As shown in Figure 4, the
reduced storage requirements directly translate to a reduction
in traffic required to synchronize with the Bitcoin network.
For instance, synchronizing from a snapshot on block height
600 000 with a chaintail length of 1000, joining nodes only
inflict 5.03 GiB of traffic when using CoinPrune, whereas
legacy nodes would cause 229.62 GiB of traffic to bootstrap
successfully. Over the whole blockchain, achievable savings
average at 92.50 %. Joining nodes currently have to obtain two
orders of magnitude less data during initial synchronization,
which is largely dominated by acquiring the snapshot.
A similar trend can be observed for the overall synchroniza-
tion time of joining nodes, i.e., obtaining and verifying the
headerchain, the snapshot, and the chaintail. Figure 5 shows
that CoinPrune improves synchronization times over Bitcoin’s
whole history, resulting in savings of 75.58 % on average
for joining nodes. Even though Bitcoin mitigates reverifying
very old transactions due to its assumed-valid blocks (cf.
Section IV-B), joining nodes still must replay the whole trans-
action graph. Contrarily, CoinPrune avoids this step as well
due to its reliance on snapshots. In consequence, CoinPrune
currently enables joining nodes to catch up with the Bitcoin
network in 46 min instead of 5 h using standard Bitcoin. This
time saving is especially beneficial as initial synchronization
is often considered a major scalability concern [9], [19].
Takeaway. The snapshot-based approach of CoinPrune un-
burdens both established and joining nodes from major over-
head stemming from Bitcoin’s bootstrapping process regarding
storage, traffic, and synchronization time. Hence, CoinPrune
establishes a secure and effective means to vastly improve
Bitcoin’s long-term durability.
X. CONCLUSION
CoinPrune tackles the increasing scalability issues of public
blockchain systems such as Bitcoin. These issues stem from
growing storage and performance issues as nodes keep, re-
distribute, and reverify obsolete, historical data for security
reasons. We have shown that we can extend Bitcoin with an
effective and secure block-pruning scheme without protocol-
breaking changes by having honest miners create snapshots of
Bitcoin’s UTXO set and mutually reaffirm their correctness on
the blockchain. Averaged over Bitcoin’s lifetime, joining nodes
could have reduced synchronization times by 76 % this way.
Furthermore, all nodes are relieved of keeping historical data,
reducing Bitcoin’s current storage requirements of roughly
264 GiB to 9 GiB, saving currently 255 GiB with the prospects
of even more saving potential as the blockchain grows.
As future work, we plan to further tackle current limitations
of CoinPrune and block pruning in general, e.g., preserving the
currently over 5.3 m application-specific OP_RETURN outputs,
the efficiency of snapshot creation, and the potential for
removing illicit content from the UTXO set. Hence, CoinPrune
has the potential to secure Bitcoin’s long-term scalability in
an immediately applicable, but gradually deployable way.
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